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Footnotes
1. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (2004).
2. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47-48 (2008) (plurality opinion)
(summarizing caselaw stating that execution methods imposing
more pain than is required to cause death would violate the
Eighth Amendment bar on cruel and unusual punishments).
3. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601
(1986) (footnote omitted).
4. See id. at 3.
5. See id. at 3–4.
6. See id. at 7.
7. Cf. ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING
OF THE WORLD 3–4 (1985) (describing a person’s reaction to pain
as retaining inherently personal aspects).
Important legal distinctions turn on the presence and degreeof physical pain. Statutes refer to degrees of physical pain todefine criminal offenses like torture-murder,1 while pain
that rises to the level of cruelty draws the boundary between
constitutionally permissible and impermissible punishment.2
Claims about pain motivate legislative action to protect previ-
ously unrecognized classes, such as in several states’ recent
passage of statutes concerning fetal pain and fetal anesthesia
during abortion.3 In legal domains ranging from tort to torture,
pain and its degree do important definitional work by estab-
lishing boundaries of lawfulness and of entitlements. 
For all of the work done by pain as a term in statutes, trea-
tises, constitutions, and administrative- and common-law
jurisprudence, it has had a troubling lack of externally verifi-
able reality.4 Like other subjective, affective states, pain has
been invisible and, frequently, unspeakable.5 Though we have
been able to impute pain based on experience or knowledge or
by observing expressions of it in behavior, we have not been
able to observe or measure it directly.6 For this reason, claims
of great pain come with great doubt.
But now, pain rests on the cusp of visibility. That is, neu-
roimaging technology is in the process of making pain, anxiety,
certain forms of deception, and potentially myriad other sub-
jective states at least partly knowable and quantifiable.  This
article, which is part of a broader project exploring the role of
pain imaging in law, argues that statutory definitions of chronic
pain and judicial interpretations both of such statutes and of
evidence presented by chronic-pain claimants must be updated
to reflect recent discoveries that various chronic-pain syn-
dromes constitute verifiable and distinct neurological disorders.
Assessing the impact that the neuroimaging of pain may
have on diverse areas of law illuminates the point that legal
issues concerning the body rarely assume the form of straight-
forward questions about physical facts or measurement.
Though they may involve measurement, they also fundamen-
tally implicate the normative dimension of how suffering relates
to empathy and of who deserves (or does not deserve) empathy
in the law. Indeed, pain discourse in law frequently is a proxy
or heuristic for values and for moral or normative judgments.
Attempting to solve certain normatively freighted legal prob-
lems, like what constitutes torture, or cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, through quantification would be profoundly mis-
guided. There are serious empirical and epistemic questions as
to whether even perfect pain quantification could modify or
improve ostensibly pain-related areas of legal doctrine. This is
not because the technology is not “there yet” (although it is
not) but more fundamentally because certain doctrinal legal
issues presented as pain-measurement problems are predomi-
nantly values problems—problems about whose suffering
counts and how much suffering we will tolerate to be inflicted
upon or experienced by different categories of persons.
It is not accidental that pain functions as a moral status
indicator; rather, this stems from the unique relationship
between pain and empathy. Our conceptions of rights and
duties are necessarily informed by human physicality and con-
strained by the limits of empathic identification. A person’s
moral proscription against excess pain ends when that person
encounters the boundaries of empathic identification—the
ability to say that a category of subjects is in some way “like
us.”7 This helps explain why different groups can hold incom-
patible intuitions about whether the infliction of excess pain
constitutes a wrong, separate even from the infliction of death,
in such disparate and morally contentious areas as the death
penalty, pre-viability abortion, and animal welfare. Pain mea-
surement thus represents the archetypal example of how to
properly understand if, when, and how to adapt the findings of
brain imaging to bodies of legal doctrine. Attempts to resolve
values-laden issues with neuroimaging or other forms of hedo-
nic quantification would suffer from a measurement fallacy;
this would in turn produce policy prescriptions as morally
unconvincing as they would be practically infeasible.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the biology
of pain and the science of pain detection, focusing on functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) for the detection of acute
pain. It incorporates current medical and scientific research and
interviews with leading pain researchers in the United States and
United Kingdom who offer their views on the potential and lim-
its of pain detection. This part contends that, while stunning
advances have occurred in neuroimaging, current and in-princi-
ple barriers to accurate pain measurement remain.
Part II presents the first of two case studies. It analyzes
criminal torture-murder statutes (with related caselaw) and
then analyzes state torture statutes and treaties, both of which
facially speak in terms of quanta of pain. As part II will show,
torture-murder and state torture function as an expressive des-
ignation for the categories of offenses that are most norma-
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8. See Pain Management Basics, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/
pain-management/guide/pain-basics; see also FAQs: What Is Pain?
THE BRITISH PAIN SOC’Y, http://www.britishpainsociety.org/
patient_faq.htm#q1.
9. See FAQS: What Is Pain? supra note 8; The Autonomic Nervous Sys-
tem, NAT’L DYSAUTONOMIA RES. FOUND., http://www.ndrf.org/
ans.html.
10. See Phantom Pain: Definition, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayo
clinic.org/diseases-conditions/phantom-pain/basics/definition/
con-20023268; see also OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIS
WIFE FOR A HAT 66–70 (1985) (recounting a patient who had dam-
aged proprioception that caused him to lose his sense of balance).
11. This is the mechanism through which local anesthetics like
bupivacaine work: by flooding the sodium channels in the nerve
fibers around where it is injected, the anesthetic blocks the
nerves from transmitting signals up to the brain. See STEPHEN E.
ABRAM, PAIN MEDICINE: THE REQUISITES IN ANESTHESIOLOGY 91–93
(2006) (describing bupivacaine and other sensory-blocking
local anesthetics).
12. Id. at 12–13 (describing descending control in nociception and
pain).
13. Id. at 28.
14. A conscious person may experience no pain if nerve signaling from
the site of injury to the spinal cord or brain has been blocked. This
is the mechanism by which local anesthetic and epidurals work.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., C. Richard
Chapman, Pain Perception, Affective Mechanisms, and Conscious
Experience, in PAIN: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 59, 59–60
(Thomas Hadjistavropoulos & Kenneth D. Craig eds., 2004).
15. Contrast this with the description of a nerve block injection, see
supra note 11, which prevents signal transmission from the nerve
to the brain. General anaesthesia does not block afferent signal
transmission; rather, “[t]he anesthetized brain doesn’t respond to
pain signals or surgical manipulations.” General Anesthesia: Defin-
ition, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/
anesthesia/basics/definition/prc-20014786.
tively transgressive. Consistent with liberal political theory, the
harm, although tied to the body, primarily lies in the expres-
sion of corrupt values relative to the autonomy and person-
hood of the victim.
Part III presents a second set of case studies that examine
the role of pain in Eighth Amendment challenges to execution
by lethal injection and in recent legislation restricting late-term
abortion. In these areas, advocates who oppose state execution
or abortion frame their challenges to the contested practices as
challenges to excess physical suffering—that the state should
neither inflict nor countenance the infliction of suffering on
the condemned or the unborn. However, despite their anti-
pain rhetoric, important normative commitments independent
of objections to physical pain animate activists who work in
these areas.
Part IV draws on the insights from the case studies to
develop the concept of embodied morality: the idea that facts
about the body do not translate directly into legal conclusions
or concepts but do inform a community’s norms about what
constitutes morally permissible treatment of the body. Pain’s
role across different areas of law thus provides a fascinating
lens through which to understand legal notions of the embod-
ied person and its normative dimensions.
I. PAIN AND PAIN IMAGING: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION
A. ACUTE PAIN: DEFINITION AND MECHANISMS
1. Definition and Basic Mechanisms of Acute Pain
Acute pain is the pain that a person experiences immediately
when something goes wrong. Such pain results from the brain’s
translation of signals it receives from the body’s contact with a
noxious external stimulus, like a hot stove, or from a sudden
change in the body’s internal condition, like intestinal cramps.
Acute pain is characterized not by its severity but by its sud-
denness and short duration. Although there exists a common
vernacular misuse of “acute pain” to mean “very severe pain,”
acute pain may indeed be only minor or moderate. For exam-
ple, the pain of getting a paper cut and of breaking a leg are
both acute, but the former is minor while the latter is severe.
Acute pain is the basic pain model and is also a highly impor-
tant survival mechanism that
motivates the sufferer to get away
from the harmful thing.8
Regardless of where pain orig-
inates in the body, the brain acts
as the central processing unit for
pain. The pain-detecting nerves
present in the part of the body
that encounters the noxious stim-
ulus send the message to the
brain through ascending or
“afferent” neurons. The brain
interprets the signal and then
sends signals back via descending
or “efferent” neurons to where the afferent signal originated. The
signal from the brain back to the peripheral site can be amped
up or tamped down by descending modulation. That is, the
body’s physiological state (including mental state) can both
magnify and moderate the pain signal.9
Although we often think of pain as being instantaneous and
“in” a particular body part, it is possible to demonstrate in a
few ways that pain is actually not “in” the place that feels hurt.
One classic example is the experience of pain in body parts
that no longer exist: so-called phantom limb pain. That phe-
nomenon may cause pain in a missing hand that feels exactly
like pain in a physically present hand.10 Conversely, if signal-
ing to the brain has been blocked, a noxious stimulus applied
to the physically present hand will produce no pain at all.11
Thus, there is no simple one-to-one relationship between
harm to the peripheral site, signal strength up to the brain,
efferent signal strength back down to the site, and pain per-
ception.12 The brain’s reception and interpretation of the affer-
ent signal is essential for the brain’s detection of and response
to aversive stimuli, but pain perception requires something
more.13 The brain must receive and interpret the afferent sig-
nal and operationalize conscious awareness of the signal.14
2. The Role of Consciousness in Pain
Without consciousness, there is no pain. Consider the case of
a person who is anaesthetized with general anesthesia for a sur-
gical procedure. Anesthesia renders the person unconscious;15
“Although we
often think of
pain as being
instantaneous
and ‘in’ a 
particular body
part, [sometimes]
pain is actually
not ‘in’ the place
that feels hurt.”
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16. See Robert J. Gatchel et al., The Biopsychosocial Approach to
Chronic Pain: Scientific Advances and Future Directions, 133 PSY-
CHOL. BULL. 581, 582 (2007).
17. The thalamus is “the main relay site for nociceptive inputs before
cortical and subcortical structures.” Petra Schweinhardt et al.,
Imaging Pain in Patients: Is It Meaningful? 19 CURRENT OPINION
NEUROLOGY 392, 397 (2006).
18. See M.N. Baliki et al., Parsing Pain Perception Between Nociceptive
Representation and Magnitude Estimation, 101 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY
875, 885 (2009) (describing how the insula activates sensory
modalities during pain perception).
19. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE, Somatosensory Cortex, in MEDICAL
SUBJECT HEADINGS, available at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/cgi/mesh/
2014/MB_cgi?mode=&index=12446&field=all&HM=&II=&PA=
&form=&input= (defining the somatosensory cortex as the “[a]rea
of the parietal lobe concerned with receiving general sensations”).
20. Gatchel et al., supra note 16, at 582.
21. See id.
22. Similarly, though many of us have had the experience of being
woken from sleep by pain, we did not feel it as pain until we
awoke.
23. See id.; cf. Donald D. Price et al., Integrating Experiential-Phenom-
enological Methods and Neuroscience to Study Neural Mechanisms of
Pain and Consciousness, 11 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 593, 597
(2002) (arguing that a subjective, “first person experiential”
approach is an essential component to the study of pain).
24. See, e.g., Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere, Some Foundational
Problems in the Scientific Study of Pain, 69 PHIL. SCI. S265, S266
(2002); Price et al., supra note 23, at 595; Jennifer Radden, A Con-
fusion of Pains: The Sensory and Affective Components of Pain, Suf-
fering, and Hurt, in FACT AND VALUE IN EMOTION 65, 66–69 (Louis
C. Charland & Peter Zachar eds., 2008); Sydney Shoemaker, The
First-Person Perspective, in THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: PHILO-
SOPHICAL DEBATES 503, 503–05 (Ned Block et al. eds., 1997).
25. A heat stimulus—a heated piece of metal applied to the arm—is
the most common research protocol for acute pain in the lab. A
standardized heat stimulus delivered by laser is also commonly
used. Use of uniform stimuli allows researchers working in differ-
ent laboratories to compare their results. See, e.g., Susanna J.
Bantick et al., Imaging How Attention Modulates Pain in Humans
Using Functional MRI, 125 BRAIN 310, 312 (2002) (applying
“[t]hermal noxious stimuli . . . using a thermal resistor” in mea-
suring “experimentally induced pain”).
26. PET stands for “positron emission tomography.”  For an overview
of different brain imaging techniques, see generally MATT CARTER
& JENNIFER SHIEH, GUIDE TO RESEARCH TECHNIQUES IN NEURO-
SCIENCE 1–23 (2010).
27. See Kenneth L. Casey et al., Positron Emission Tomographic Analy-
sis of Cerebral Structures Activated Specifically by Repetitive Noxious
Heat Stimuli, 71 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 802, 805–06 (1994); A. May,
Neuroimaging: Visualising the Brain in Pain, 28 NEUROLOGICAL SCI.
S101, S101 (2007) (summarizing earlier PET research). Typically,
activation is seen in the contralateral thalamus.  U. Bingel et al.,
Single Trial fMRI Reveals Significant Contralateral Bias in Responses
to Laser Pain Within Thalamus and Somatosensory Cortices, 18
NEUROIMAGE 740, 740–41 (2003).
however, it does not prevent the
operation’s target tissues from reg-
istering noxious stimuli.16 When
the surgeon cuts into the patient’s
abdomen, the tissues still send
messages to the brain (unless
nerves also have been locally
blocked)—principally to the thal-
amus,17 insula,18 and somatosen-
sory cortex19—relaying informa-
tion. This signal transmission,
called “nociception,” meaning the
detection and transmission of sig-
nals about noxious stimuli, hap-
pens even though the patient does
not feel the incision.20 Nociception does not translate into pain,
though, because the brain is not at that moment conscious, and
thus the person remains unaware.21
At first, this distinction between pain and nociception might
seem peculiar. The distinction becomes intuitive and familiar,
however, if we shift from thinking about pain to other phe-
nomenological states like cold, thirst, or hunger. If a patient is
anaesthetized for long enough, blood-sugar levels may drop or
the patient may become dehydrated; however, the patient will
not feel hungry or thirsty. Operating theaters are kept cool,
causing the patient’s body temperature to drop; even so, the
patient will not feel cold (at least until the patient wakes up).
We would not expect the unconscious patient to feel these
things; all phenomenological (or experiential) states require
consciousness.22 Pain perception is continuous with all other
subjectively perceived body states, which can only be said to
exist when they intrude upon consciousness.23
Accordingly, the nociception/pain distinction does not differ
much from the relationships between lack of sleep and fatigue,
dehydration and thirst, and so forth. This fundamentally sub-
jective, phenomenological quality of pain has generated exten-
sive literature (and controversy) within the field of philosophy
of mind.24 Certainly, different people may have different experi-
ences of pain, even in response to the same external or internal
stimuli. Yet, understanding pain—or hunger or cold or thirst—
for most practical purposes ought not be particularly mysteri-
ous or require unraveling the nature of consciousness. 
B. ACUTE PAIN IN THE SCANNER
The brain’s processing of different noxious stimuli correlates
with activation in several specific regions. Further, the degree of
activation in certain parts of the brain correlates well with the
intensity of pain or discomfort reported by a subject. In other
words, the physiology and the phenomenology seem closely
related. The main challenge is that the degree of activation and
its relationship to the intensity of pain or discomfort does not
correlate very well across subjects. This section describes the
brain regions involved in pain processes and the fMRI research
correlating brain activation with subjective experience.
1. Specific Areas of Brain Activity Correlate with
Painful Stimulus
Many regions of the brain become active in research sub-
jects who experience a painful heat stimulus.25 Identified in
the 1990s with PET scanning,26 the major areas that display
activity in response to acute pain include the anterior insula,
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), primary and secondary
somatosensory cortex, and thalamus.27 More recent acute-pain
studies also find activation in the prefrontal cortex, supple-
“This section
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brain regions
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28. See Gatchel et al., supra note 16, at 592–93 (citing and reviewing
extensive literature).
29. See id. at 582.
30. See Jeanne D. Talbot et al., Multiple Representations of Pain in
Human Cerebral Cortex, 251 SCIENCE 1355, 1355–56 (1991). But
see Andrew K. Jones et al., Localization of Responses to Pain in
Human Cerebral Cortex, 255 SCIENCE 215, 215 (1992) (presenting
Jones’s comment on Talbot’s article and Talbot’s response).
31. See Bantick et al., supra note 25, at 316–18.
32. See id. at 317 (noting how the anterior cingulate cortex provides
an emotion-processing function).
mental motor cortex, basal ganglia, cerebellum, amygdala, hip-
pocampus, hypothalamus, and periaqueductal gray (PAG).28
This section will briefly describe the role of these various brain
regions and why pain response is distributed so widely across
the brain.
So many parts of the brain respond to painful stimuli
because pain is a multidimensional experience: it involves sen-
sory, motor, and affective components as well as memory and
executive functions (like planning and self-control).29 When a
conscious person perceives pain, activity likely arises in the
prefrontal cortex, thalamus, insula, anterior cingulate cortex,
and brain areas correlated with sensory perception
(somatosensory cortex and somatosensory association areas).
The individual may reflexively or deliberately move away from
the stimulus, activating brain areas involved in motor function
(like the motor cortex and cerebellum).30 The individual may
turn to distractions in order to minimize the experience of the
pain, an exercise in self-control that also would engage the pre-
frontal cortex.31 The individual will have an instantaneous,
negative affective reaction to the pain, engaging the amygdala
and anterior cingulate cortex, key areas of the brain involved
with emotional processing.32 The individual may utilize
implicit and explicit memory to identify what the pain experi-
ence is; this would involve several areas of the brain, including
the hippocampus and likely also (again) the somatosensory
association cortex. If the memory involves visual recollection,
there will also be activity in, among other areas, the occipital
lobe. Thus, the sum of processes and reactions that we call
“pain” involves nearly a whole-brain experience.
2. Degree of Brain Activation Correlates with
Degree of Reported Pain
Studies involving fMRI acute-pain imaging show that a per-
son’s degree of brain activation correlates—not perfectly, but
well—with self-reported degree of pain. That is, people who
report more sensitivity to a painful stimulus show greater brain
activity in areas of the brain associated with pain perception
(and people who report less sensitivity to the stimulus show
less). Therefore, brain activation at least crudely matches sub-
jective experience.
This is a truly striking result because it suggests an answer
to the centuries-long debate about whether people who
respond more or less “stoically” to pain actually experience the
pain differently or whether the more stoic one is simply men-
tally tougher in the face of the same degree of experienced pain.
In laboratory subjects who report their degree of pain honestly
(i.e., they have incentives neither to exaggerate nor act tough),
a direct relationship exists between biological response and psy-
chological experience. This means that people who report pain
differently actually experience pain differently. 
3. Experimental Error
The kinds of fMRI-based
pain assessments described
above could produce both
type-one and type-two errors—
that is, false positives and false
negatives. False-positive and
false-negative results from
fMRI pain detection could
result in several ways.
First, consider the case in
which activation above a signif-
icant threshold is present in
areas of the brain associated
with pain perception (both
nociception and affective expe-
rience). This should indicate that a person is experiencing pain.
However, a person may not subjectively feel pain. Predicting
pain based on this scan pattern could produce type-one errors.
The second case is where activation above a significant
threshold is not present in areas of the brain associated with
pain perception (nociception and affective experience). This
should indicate that a person is not experiencing pain. How-
ever, the subject still could subjectively be experiencing pain
because of a low pain threshold (whether as a result of tran-
sient affective state or physiology or some combination of
both). Predicting the absence of pain based on this scan pat-
tern could produce both type-one and type-two errors.
The third case is where areas of the brain associated with
nociception experience activation above a significant threshold
but areas related to affective experience do not. This could pro-
duce either a type-one or type-two error. It could suggest any
of the following: that the subject is registering nociception but
not experiencing pain; the subject is registering nociception
and is experiencing pain but is not highly affectively aroused;
the subject is sedated, experiencing interference with affective
processing of the painful stimulus; or that the areas of the
brain related to affective experience are otherwise suppressed
(whether through chemical means, unconsciousness, organic
brain damage, or difference). On the phenomenological level,
it would not be possible to determine from the scan whether
the subject definitely does or does not experience pain.
The fourth case is the flipside: where activation above a sig-
nificant threshold is present in areas of the brain associated with
affective experience but not in the areas related to nociception.
This also could produce either a type-one or type-two error. It
could suggest any of the following: that the subject is not in
pain; the subject is not registering significant nociception but is
experiencing pain because of unusual sensitivity to pain; the
subject is not registering significant nociception but is experi-
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degree of brain
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33. See ARTHUR W. TOGA & JOHN C. MAZZIOTTA, BRAIN MAPPING: THE
METHODS 341 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing signal-to-noise ratios in
fMRI scanners).
34. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
35. Researchers refer to this as the effect of “set and setting.” “Set” is
the subject’s ingoing mindset (fearful, eager, relaxed) while “set-
ting” is the context in which the experience takes place, including
the subject’s perceived degree of control. The same subject may
receive the same amount of the same compound and have an
intensely different reaction based on changes in set and setting
across the two experiences. See Louis A. Faillace & Stephen Szara,
Hallucinogenic Drugs: Influence of Mental Set and Setting, 29 DIS-
EASES NERVOUS SYS. 124, 125–26 (1968).
encing pain because the subject
is highly affectively aroused
(e.g., by fear). Thus, it would
not be possible to determine
with confidence from the scan
whether the subject definitely is
or is not experiencing pain.
In each of the above exam-
ples, the “threshold” for activa-
tion is itself absolutely critical
in determining whether the
subject is likely experiencing
pain or not. A true resting state
for the brain does not exist, as
the only time when the brain
performs no activity at all is at death. Thus, researchers have to
determine what degree of activity in a particular brain region
counts as “significant,” a trickier and more subjective task than
determining statistical significance for, say, population size in
an epidemiological study or political poll. Researchers deter-
mine significance in fMRI studies by balancing signal and
noise. If the software that crunches the data from the scans is
programmed to be very sensitive to differences in scan signal
between task one and task two, it will pick up even very faint,
relative activations.33 This may help researchers focus in on a
needle in a haystack, but it will also make it look like there are
needles everywhere. However, if the software is programmed
to be less sensitive to differences in signal between task one
and task two, then it will only pick up differences that are com-
paratively large; in a sense, it will find the broomstick in the
haystack but might miss some needles.
C. DIRECT LEGAL UTILITY?
As summarized above, the brain does not have any single
“pain spot” or pain-perceiving organ. And we know that pain
varies across and within subjects and depends on internal and
external context. Yet, a few affirmative generalizations can be
made. First, nociception of various kinds generally will involve
activation in the insula and thalamus,34 although many other
phenomena also involve activation of these brain regions. Sec-
ond, fMRI may be useful for inferring the absence of nocicep-
tion and pain. Third, fMRI may have some limited utility in
supporting inferences about the presence and degree of acute
pain. These proposed techniques or methods may generate
type-one and type-two errors; researchers would need to do
more work to establish the confidence levels in the results.
Additionally, such tools may be subject to countermeasures.
1. Inferring Absence of Nociception and Pain
At this point in its development, fMRI could be used to indi-
cate the absence of nociception and acute pain. In the presence
of nociception, observers can expect, at a minimum, engage-
ment of the contralateral thalamus, insula, and somatosensory
cortex. This should be true across individuals and types of
noxious stimuli. Additionally, in the presence of subjectively
perceived acute pain, activation would typically occur in areas
related to affective processing, including the anterior cingulate
cortex and amygdala. There would also be heightened activa-
tion in the prefrontal cortex as a marker of executive function.
Note that the inference of no pain follows only in the com-
plete absence of such activation, not if merely very low coor-
dinated activation is present. Because pain is phenomenologi-
cal, the only sure way to know if a person is in pain is to ask.
A person showing very low levels of activation in these target
regions may still genuinely be in pain.
2. Partially Inferring Presence and Degree of
Acute Pain
Inferring the presence and degree of acute pain with fMRI
poses a greater challenge than demonstrating its absence. As
noted above, the degree of activation correlates fairly well with
degree of experienced pain. Thus, a research subject must hon-
estly self-report experienced pain for a researcher to accurately
correlate the pain to a contemporaneous scan. If a person
either cannot respond (maybe he or she is in a coma or has
locked-in syndrome) or has an incentive not to respond hon-
estly, the researcher has no reliable way to infer the true pain
level from the scan in the absence of a reliable self-report.
Again, this result stems from the fact that people experience
stimuli as “painful” at quite different thresholds and reflect the
experience in different levels of brain activation.
In the best-case scenario, a researcher would take readings
of an individual subject’s self-reported pain levels and brain
activation over time in response to stimuli graduated from
non-noxious to highly noxious. This would establish this sub-
ject’s average sensitivity to noxious stimuli. Then, the
researcher could expose the subject to a stimulus, take a brain
image, and estimate the subject’s phenomenological experi-
ence of pain based on a comparison with prior correlations of
self-reporting and scan data. The researcher could then assign
a confidence level to the phenomenological guess.
Even in this purely hypothetical best-case scenario, predic-
tion of pain phenomenology remains dicey because individual
subjects simply are not very consistent in their pain perception
over time and across different internal contexts.35 In testing
across subjects, it might be possible to say that a particular
response would fall a certain number of standard deviations
away from the average subject response. The researcher could
then give a probabilistic or statistical estimate of how likely the
subject will experience the degree of pain reported. These
“[T]he brain does
not have any 
single‘pain spot’
or pain-perceiving
organ[, and]pain
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36. In presenting this work in informal talks, the suggestion has
arisen several times that researchers could use fMRI to compile
tables of the “average painfulness” of particular types of torture.
This, proponents argue, would at least lead to transparency and
enforceability in torture practices.
Three fundamental problems arise from this argument: it is
unnecessary, it misses the point, and it invites more subterfuge than
it eliminates. First, a sophisticated laboratory inquiry with 7-tesla
magnets on a statistically significant set of subjects is not necessary
to tell any mentally and morally competent person what kinds of
things hurt and about how much. Second, much conduct that is
physically painful but not excruciating is understood to constitute
torture because of the conjunction of its painfulness and its norma-
tive meaning—for example, rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse. Third,
as soon as certain conduct becomes de jure insufficiently painful to
constitute torture, the race to exacerbate the painfulness of the per-
mitted conduct will ignite. This would create a back door into tor-
ture—victims could be treated with every appearance of lawfulness,
indeed with a presumption of lawfulness, yet suffer torture.
This is not conjecture or speculation. In 2005, the United States
Department of Justice issued two interrogation memoranda that used
pain-perception research in precisely this way. These recently declas-
sified memoranda used the research of, among others, Bernd Kun-
dermann et al., The Effect of Sleep Deprivation on Pain, 9 PAIN RES. &
MGMT. 25, 31 (2004), available at http://www.pulsus.com/
journals/toc.jsp?sCurrPg=journal&jnlKy=7&isuKY=550 (conclud-
ing that sleep deprivation leads to heightened pain sensitivity and
reduced response to analgesic drugs), to recommend extended sleep
deprivation—specifically for the purpose of enhancing the painful-
ness of otherwise-authorized interrogation techniques, including
beatings and waterboarding. See Justice Department Interrogation
Memos Abuse Sleep Deprivation Research, UNION OF CONCERNED SCI-
ENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/ abuses_of_sci-
ence/justice-department.html (citing Justice Department memo-
randa to the Central Intelligence Agency, available at
http://documents.nytimes.com/justice-department-memos-on-inter-
rogation-techniques#p=39); Noah Schactman, Sleep Scientists:
Research Twisted to Justify Torture, WIRED.CO.UK, Apr. 22, 2009,
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2009-04/23/sleep-research-
twisted-to-justify-torture; Michael Scherer, Scientists Claim CIA Mis-
used Work on Sleep Deprivation, TIME, Apr. 21, 2009, available at
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1892897,00.html.
37. The second set of case studies appears infra Part III.
38. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2008) (including murder
“by means of . . . torture” in the definition of first-degree murder);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (defining murder to include “the
intentional application of torture to a human being, which results
in the death of a human being”).
39. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001. In states like Idaho, the intent require-
ment is relaxed; an offense constitutes torture-murder not only
where “intent to cause suffering” is present but also “irrespective of
proof of intent to cause suffering.” Id. (emphasis added).
40. People v. Cook, 139 P.3d 492, 519 (Cal. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This California standard does not include “pun-
ishment,” but many other statutes do. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §
18-4003(a) (including “intent . . . to execute vengeance” in first-
degree torture-murder). Legal dictionaries define “torture” as fol-
lows: “[t]he infliction of intense pain to the body or mind to pun-
ish, to extract a confession or information, or to obtain sadistic
pleasure.” See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1627 (9th ed. 2009).
41. See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
42. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001. This definition of private torture has
long been established in American law. See, e.g., Territory v. Vial-
pando, 42 P. 64, 65 (N.M. 1895) (defining torture as the infliction
of “pain, anguish, pang[, or] . . . extreme pain”).
43. 40 AM. JUR. 2d Homicide § 41 (2008) (citing State v. Pierce, 488
S.E.2d 576, 588 (N.C. 1997)).
44. In State v. Crawford, 406 S.E.2d 579, 589 (N.C. 1991), the defen-
dant challenged his conviction under the state’s torture-murder
statute on the ground that the statute’s use of the term “torture”
was vague. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied the chal-
lenge, holding that the meaning of torture as extreme or prolonged
pain is more or less self-evident and “puts a reasonable person on
notice of what is forbidden.” Id. at 590.
numerous extrapolative steps, though, reduce the power and
credibility of such tests.36
II. CASE STUDY: PAIN AS HEURISTIC IN TORTURE AND
TORTURE-MURDER
Part I explored the question of whether neuroimaging tech-
nologies can measure acute pain with precision and reliability
on an individual level and concluded that fMRI acute-pain
measurement has significant technical and in-principle limita-
tions, as well as some power under carefully controlled exper-
imental conditions. This part turns to the doctrinal and epis-
temic questions of whether, if perfect pain quantification were
to exist, it would improve doctrine and practice in certain
putatively pain-defined areas of law. It explores these questions
through the first of two sets of case studies:37 the cases of crim-
inal torture-murder and state torture.
A. TORTURE-MURDER
The importance of pain as a signal in the law seems
nowhere clearer than in the historically, deeply rooted crime of
torture-murder. Torture-murder consists of a simple act
requirement and a single intent requirement. For the act
requirement, torture-murder must include the commission of
acts of torture resulting in
death;38 for the intent require-
ment, there must be something
like the “intentional infliction of
extreme and prolonged pain with
the intent to cause suffering.”39
Though torture-murder statutes
appear to limit the offense to the
infliction of pain for particular
corrupt purposes only, that limi-
tation turns out to be hollow
because the statutorily proscribed
purposes are often “revenge, extortion, persuasion, [punish-
ment], or . . . any sadistic purpose.”40
While defining “torture” relative to state actors remains
highly contested,41 state legislatures and courts appear to have
little difficulty defining exactly what torture is among private
parties. It is the “intentional infliction of extreme and pro-
longed pain”42 or “grievous pain and suffering”43 upon another.
Further, courts have held that because society generally has
enough common understanding of this definition of torture,
torture-murder statutes provide sufficient notice of prohibited
conduct and thus are not unconstitutionally vague.44
“The importance
of pain as a 
signal in the law
seems nowhere
clearer than in
the deeply
rooted crime of
torture-murder.”
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45. See, e.g., People v. Steger, 546 P.2d 665, 669 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
46. Murder by torture does not require premeditation or intent to kill.
Cf. People v. Davis, 234 Cal. Rptr. 859, 863 (Ct. App. 1987) (infer-
ring that the jury found “willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing” in the absence of a finding of torture-murder). Specific
intent to kill is irrelevant when first-degree murder is perpetrated
by torture. See Crawford, 406 S.E.2d at 587. Neither premeditation
nor intent to kill is an element of first-degree murder perpetrated
by torture. See State v. Phillips, 399 S.E.2d 293, 303 (N.C. 1991).
47. Less frequently, states use the formulation “heinous, cruel, and
depraved” (HCD). See generally Richard W. Garnett, Note,
Depravity Thrice Removed: Using the “Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved”
Factor to Aggravate Convictions of Nontriggermen Accomplices in
Capital Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 2471, 2497–99 (1994) (describing
HCD factors and detailing the relationship between statutory cru-
elty and physical pain).
48. State v. Piper, 709 N.W.2d 783, 799 (S.D. 2006) (quoting State v.
Rhines, 548 N.W.2d 415, 448 (S.D. 1996) (defining torture under
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(6) (2004), as the “unnecessary
and wanton infliction of severe pain, agony, or anguish” and “the
intent to inflict such pain, agony or anguish”); see also State v.
Kiles, 857 P.2d 1212, 1221 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (“[C]ruelty may
be found when a defendant intends to inflict mental anguish or
physical pain.”). Some courts require a finding of specific intent
to inflict pain and suffering. See, e.g., Bonifay v. State, 626 So. 2d
1310, 1313 (Fla. 1993) (defining HCD factors and stating that
they are applicable only where a defendant intends extreme pain
and torture); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 612 A.2d 395, 400 (Pa.
1992) (per curiam) (noting that the aggravating circumstance of
torture requires intent to inflict pain).
49. Piper, 709 N.W.2d at 799. Here, “‘[u]nnecessary pain’ implies suf-
fering in excess of what is required to accomplish the murder.” Id.
(quoting Rhines, 548 N.W.2d at 452) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
50. See, e.g., People v. Campbell, 239 Cal. Rptr. 214, 224 (Ct. App.
1987) (noting in a torture-murder case that the defendant left the
victim “to suffer in pain”); Evans v. State, 800 So. 2d 182, 194
(Fla. 2001) (noting in a HAC case that the victim “suffered fear
and emotional strain”).
51. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
52. Cf. People v. Cole, 95 P.3d 811, 845 (Cal. 2004) (articulating a rule
that the victim need not perceive the pain for a conviction for
murder by torture to be upheld); People v. Pensinger, 805 P.2d
899, 910 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) (articulating a similar rule).
53. Imagine, for example, a crime that required the victim to experi-
ence one hundred units of pain. If the victim only suffered sev-
enty-three units of provable pain before death, the defendant
would enjoy immunity from conviction for the crime.
54. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 872.06 (West 2000) (defining abuse of
a dead human body as a second-degree felony).
55. People v. Elliot, 122 P.3d 968, 978 (Cal. 2005) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
A conviction on a torture-
murder charge does not require
intent to cause death. This is
remarkable because it places
torture-murder with very par-
ticular company: except for
felony murder, torture-murder
is the only capital crime for
which the defendant need not
have had any intent to kill.45
The mere intent to inflict pain
satisfies the mens rea require-
ment.46
In states that do not have
specific torture-murder statutes
but that do have the death
penalty, pain inflicted equal to
torture—so-called “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” (HAC) con-
duct upon the victim47—can differentiate ordinary murder from
capital murder. HAC factors are effectively identical to “torture”
as defined under torture-murder statutes; HAC conduct is the
infliction of “severe pain, agony, or anguish”48 or the “unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of severe pain.”49
Torture-murder and HAC statutes show that the state metes
out additional punishment for the infliction of torture upon
the victim, defined as “extreme” or “grievous pain.”  These
would seem, therefore, to be offenses largely defined by a
quantum of pain. Published opinions in torture-murder and
HAC cases dwell on the suffering of the victim’s last moments
and the degree of pain and fear the victim likely felt.50 This
reinforces the apparent linkage between the extra punishment
that the state inflicts on the torture- or HAC-murderer and the
victim’s suffering.
One might suggest that if it were possible to quantify aver-
age pain for particular acts committed upon the body, then it
might also be possible to calibrate punishment even more pre-
cisely.51 Alternatively, one might imagine a defense to a torture-
murder or HAC charge that the defendant’s conduct upon the
victim was not sufficiently painful to meet the standards
required by these statutes.52
And yet, a definition of an offense or a defense based on
quantum of pain53 might seem intuitively wrong even if it were
empirically feasible. To illustrate this point, we might hypoth-
esize an unconscious or insensate victim. A torture-murderer,
whose sole intent is to cause pain, physically abuses the
unconscious victim. The victim perceives nothing and then
dies from the injuries. The offender will in all cases be liable
for some category of homicide. One who subscribes to the
hedonic or experiential understanding of pain-based offenses
likely would argue that, because the victim did not perceive
any torture, the offender does not merit any additional pun-
ishment; in hedonic terms, the torture component of such an
offense is a nullity. Abuse of the unconscious victim, on the
hedonic view, could equate to abuse of a dead body, a far lesser
offense that obviously has no hedonic component and does not
avenge hedonic wrongs.54
The extra punishment for torture-murder of an uncon-
scious victim (beyond the punishment for non-torture mur-
der) shows that a concern for hedonic harms to victims does
not drive the torture-murder/HAC cases.  While torture-mur-
der and HAC are indeed defined in hedonic terms, convictions
for these offenses (and their affirmances) are independent of
the victim’s perception. As clearly articulated by the California
Supreme Court: “[A] defendant may be found guilty of murder
by torture even if the victim is never aware of any pain.”55
Numerous jurisdictions have held that a conviction for tor-
“One might 
suggest that if it
were possible to
quantify average
pain for particular
acts committed
upon the body,
then it might 
also be possible
to calibrate 
punishment even
more precisely”
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56. See, e.g., id. (establishing the “no awareness” rule in California);
Hill v. State, 724 P.2d 734, 736 & n.4 (Nev. 1986) (implying a sim-
ilar rule in Nevada by upholding the defendant’s conviction while
noting that the victim was paralyzed); Commonwealth v. Brown,
711 A.2d 444, 448, 454 (Pa. 1998) (implying a similar rule in
Pennsylvania). As discussed in Part I.A.2, an unconscious person
cannot have subjective awareness of pain, as pain has no existence
distinct from the awareness thereof.
57. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
58. An informal search of “all state and all feds (pub & unpub)” data-
bases on Westlaw, with a date parameter starting (arbitrarily) with
1985, using the search phrase “tortur! /50 (homicide murder
manslaughter) &da(aft 1/01/1985)” pulled several thousand cases
from which relevant results were counted.
59. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 50 P.3d 1100, 1104–05 (Nev. 2002)
(death of adult woman in rape and sexual battery with knife);
Commonwealth v. Elliott, 700 A.2d 1243, 1247 (Pa. 1997) (death
of adult woman during rape and sexual battery, involving stran-
gulation).
60. See, e.g., People v. Mincey, 827 P.2d 388, 398–99 (Cal. 1992)
(murder by prolonged beating of five-year-old boy); State v. Lee,
501 S.E.2d 334, 337–39 (N.C. 1998) (abuse of child over a one-
week period resulting in death); Hernandez, 50 P.3d at 1104–05;
Brown, 711 A.2d at 454 (death of a child by sexual torture where
victim was possibly unconscious due to blood loss); Common-
wealth v. Edmiston, 634 A.2d 1078, 1084 (Pa. 1993) (mutilation
of a two-year-old kidnapping victim by beating, carving, and sex-
ual abuse).
61. We might conceive of “mental suffering” and severe physical pain
as equally constitutive of torture. The relationship of physical and
mental pain, and whether mental “suffering” and mental “pain”
are equivalent or identical concepts and experiences, deserve
exploration in their own right but are beyond the scope of this
article. Preliminary work suggests that many forms of acute emo-
tional distress involve the same brain regions as acute-physical-
pain experience—that the neurobiology tracks the phenomenol-
ogy when we speak of “the pain of rejection” or the feeling of
“broken-heartedness.” In this domain, language is wise; it con-
tains intuitions of our embodiment.  It is not my normative claim
that mental pain cannot constitute torture. Rather, this is a
descriptive claim that, while torture definitions include a mental
suffering or anguish prong, the suffering inherent to torture
remains constructed as primarily physical.
62. 18 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 278 (James A.H. Murray et al. eds.,
2d ed. 1991) (defining torture as the “infliction of severe bodily
pain, as punishment or a means of persuasion; spec. judicial tor-
ture, inflicted by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority, for the pur-
pose of forcing an accused or suspected person to confess, or an
unwilling witness to give evidence or information”).
63. See, e.g., Nigel S. Rodley, 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 861 (15th
ed. 1998), available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/600270/torture (defining “torture” as “the infliction of
severe physical or mental pain or suffering for a purpose, such as
extracting information, coercing a confession, or inflicting pun-
ishment . . . [that is] normally committed by a public official or
other person exercising comparable power and authority”); Seu-
mas Miller, Torture, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr. 29, 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/torture/ (“Torture includes such
practices as searing with hot irons, burning at the stake, electric
shock treatment to the genitals  . . . and denying food, water or
sleep for days or weeks on end. All of these practices presuppose
that the torturer has control over the victim’s body, e.g. the victim
is strapped to a chair. Most of these practices, but not all of them,
involve the infliction of extreme physical pain.”).
64. See, e.g., The Ethics of Torture, PHILOSOPHY TALK (Apr. 10, 2010),
http://philosophytalk.org/shows/ethics-torture-1 (pointing out the
broader categorization of torture to include both physical and
mental anguish); cf. David Luban, The Fundamental Trick: Pre-
tending That “Torture” is a Technical Term, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 26,
2010), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/02/fundamental-trick-
pretending-that.html (arguing that torture is defined by severe
pain, as elaborated in David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the
Ticking Time Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1425–28 (2005) [here-
inafter Luban, Liberalism]).
65. Elizabeth Hanson, Torture and Truth in Renaissance England, 34
REPRESENTATIONS 53, 57 (1991) (quoting Sir Thomas Smith to have
defined torture as “torment . . . which is used by the order of the
civill lawe and custome . . . to put a malefactor to excessive paine,
ture-murder may lie where the victim has no awareness of the
torture inflicted.56 This upends the notion that what we pun-
ish in this category is the actual suffering inflicted on the vic-
tim. Yet how can actual pain be irrelevant to torture-murder, an
offense statutorily defined by the infliction of “extreme” or
“grievous pain” or “agony”?57 This article posits that, in this
context, “infliction of pain” is not a description of facts about
the body but rather a proxy for certain values. Punishment
aims at the corrupt tastes and preferences of the torture-mur-
derer or HAC murderer, not the pain purportedly caused to the
victim. A review of the reported cases supports this interpreta-
tion; in the last 25 years (1985 to present), opinions have been
issued in more than 200 torture-murder cases.58 Of those,
more than half involved some kind of battery on the sexual
organs of the victim.59 Nearly half involved acts committed
against children or in the presence of children.60
Because the degree of pain experienced by the victim is
largely or totally irrelevant, torture-murder doctrine and caselaw
illustrate how a legal regime that appears to turn on pain expe-
rience and that is statutorily defined in terms of physical pain
actually rests on the notion of pain-as-proxy-for-values. The case
of torture-murder helps show that
adoption of a hedonic theory of
criminal punishment would be
inapposite because felt pain is not
the necessary (or perhaps even the
primary) object of these legal pro-
hibitions. 
B. STATE TORTURE AND
PAIN MEASUREMENT
The common understanding
of state-sanctioned or official tor-
ture finds close ties to pain. After
reflecting upon the definition of “torture,” most people would
suggest that torture equates to severe physical pain, inflicted
on the victim intentionally (and not beneficially). Indeed, this
sense that torture involves severe pain or the threat of severe
pain to the victim or the victim’s loved ones61 is tracked by
definitions drawn from dictionaries,62 encyclopedias,63 blogs,
and other repositories of cultural meaning64 and has remained
largely consistent over time.65
“This article
posits. . . 
‘infliction of
pain’ is not a
description of
facts about the
body but rather
a proxy for 
certain values.”
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to make him confesse him selfe, or of his fellowes or complices”
and noting its absence in English law in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66. See, e.g., Yutaka Arai-Yokoi, Grading Scale of Degradation: Identify-
ing the Threshold of Degrading Treatment or Punishment Under Arti-
cle 3, 21 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 385, 415 (2003).
67. See, e.g., Ian Brownlie, Interrogation in Depth: The Compton and
Parker Reports, 35 MOD. L. REV. 501, 501–02 (1972) (describing
tactics classified in British colonies as permissible “interrogation
in depth,” not torture). For a more recent example, consider the
extensive public and academic debates over whether waterboard-
ing constitutes torture; cruel, inhuman, and degrading conduct;
or permissible enhanced interrogation.
68. Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism
and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1488 (2004).
69. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113–14 (emphasis added).
70. See European Convention on Human Rights, Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224 (“No one shall be subjected
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.”).
71. Gross, supra note 68, at 1488 (citing Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, The
European Convention on Human Rights and Its Prohibition on Tor-
ture, in TORTURE 213, 213–28 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004)).
What constitutes “severe pain”?
This single question seems to have
become the battleground for cur-
rent debates about what constitutes
torture and separates it from so-
called “harsh interrogation tactics.”
Quantum of pain provides the
arena in which opponents fight out
the questions of what constitutes
torture, what constitutes the lesser
but still prohibited “cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading” (CID) treat-
ment,66 and what constitutes per-
missible conduct.67 In this way,
“the threshold test of suffering has
been used in an attempt to fly
below the radar of the absolute
prohibition on torture”68 as well as
to challenge practices not currently
classified as torture.
Could pain quantification for interrogation tactics even be
possible? In foreign prisons where torture is practiced and in
the sites of extraordinary rendition to which the United States
has sent high-value suspects for interrogation (“black sites”),
the experiment is already underway. If interrogators or jailers
already perform these functions, it should be possible to col-
lect data on the average pain associated with each technique.
There could be robust debate on what pain threshold should
separate torture from CID treatment and CID from harsh prac-
tices, as well as data integrity. But there is no reason a priori
why these theoretical and empirical problems could not also be
resolved if torture could be reduced to pain experience.
Like torture-murder, however, torture points toward the
normative dimensions of physical experience. It shows that,
while we cannot separate ourselves from our physicality, we
are not entirely reducible to it because we process our rela-
tionships with our bodies through normative constructs. Fur-
ther, discourse about pain within the context of torture may
hide the ball; for example, when the ostensible issue refers to
severity of pain, the actual issue may be the values at stake in
the treatment of detained persons. In relying on a discourse
concerned with the apparently physical, we may actually sup-
press more contentious questions about values. In this way,
pain serves as a heuristic for values and not as a description of
physical facts at all.
In any case, no measurement system for pain quantification
alone could ever definitively answer what torture is or is not
and whether in any given context particular pain-causing
actions ought to be permissible. Stances toward torture corre-
late with relative emphases on pain; that is, the harsher the
conduct the proponent seeks to permit, the more closely the
definition hews to a pain formula (and vice versa). Further,
certain of the harms that flow from torture are independent of
the harms to torture victims but rather cause harm to the state
itself and to its relations with other states, again pointing to the
irreducibility of torture as solely affecting the victims’ physical
experience. This relationship between the harms of torture and
the nature of the state is tied to the fundamental rejection of
torture in classical liberal political theory. 
1. Torture as Severe Pain
The essential relationship between torture and pain is con-
firmed by sources of political meaning such as definitions of
torture promulgated by major supranational organizations.
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UN
Convention Against Torture) defines torture as
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third per-
son information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected
of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person.69
This definition hinges on the infliction of severe physical
pain or mental anguish. Severe pain does not suffice in itself,
however; the definition also requires state action and the
restriction to particular purposes. But the essential term of this
definition is physical or mental pain; without it, conduct might
be coercive but would not amount to torture.
Unlike the UN Convention Against Torture, the European
Convention on Human Rights, though it bars torture, does not
delineate what constitutes it.70 Jurisprudence under the Con-
vention, however, has relied upon a “severity of suffering”
test.71
United States law defines torture compatibly with the UN
Convention Against Torture. Section 2340 of Title 18 of the
U.S. Code provides that torture is “an act committed by a per-
son acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict
“The essential
relationship
between torture
and pain is 
confirmed by
sources of 
political 
meaning such 
as definitions 
of torture 
promulgated 
by major 
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72. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
73. David Sussman, Defining Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 225,
226 (2006).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2340.
75. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President
on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§
2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in MARK DANNER, TORTURE
AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 115,
155 (2004).
76. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1369(d) (2006) (noting that emergency med-
ical conditions include those manifesting symptoms of severe
pain); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(d)(3)(B) (2006) (same); id.
§ 1395x(v)(1)(K)(ii) (same); id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (same); id. §
1396b(v)(3) (same); id. § 1396u-2(b)(2)(C) (same).
77. Indeed, there is “a near consensus that the legal analysis in the
Bybee Memo [is] bizarre.” Luban, Liberalism, supra note 64, at
1455.
78. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen.
(Dec. 30, 2004). The Memo opens by stating: “Torture is abhor-
rent both to American law and values and to international norms.”
Id. at 1.
79. Id. The Levin Memo’s examples of practices that would cause pro-
scribed degrees of severe pain included, for example, “severe beat-
ings to the genitals, head, and other parts of the body with metal
pipes . . . ; removal of teeth with pliers; . . . cutting off . . . fin-
gers[;]” and other, similar conduct. Id. at 10 (citing Mehinovic v.
Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1332–40, 1345–46 (N.D. Ga.
2002) and Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22–23
(D.D.C. 2001)); see also Luban, Liberalism, supra note 64, at 1456
(“Although the Levin Memo condemns torture and repudiates the
Bybee Memo’s narrow definition of ‘severe pain,’ a careful reading
shows that it does not broaden it substantially.”).
80. John T. Parry, What Is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What If We
Are?, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 249 (2003).
81. Sussman, supra note 73, at 228. See generally David Sussman,
What’s Wrong with Torture?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1, 3–5 (2005)
(arguing for an account of why torture is morally reprehensible
that transcends the mental and physical harms involved, focusing
specially on “interrogational torture”).
82. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention to
Prevent and Punish Torture art. 2, Dec. 9, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 519.
severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person
within his custody or physical control.”72
Definitions from other conventions and those promulgated
by nongovernmental organizations emphasize pain in varying
degrees; like those in U.S. law, these definitions emphasize the
intentionality of the infliction of physical pain and the specific
purposes that cause the infliction of pain or suffering to con-
stitute torture. Because of the intimate connection between
torture and pain, and perhaps for other important reasons that
will be discussed below, “[m]uch recent discussion of torture
focuses on the severity of suffering involved.”73
The most notorious recent example of torture defined
exclusively in terms of infliction of severe pain is the much
debated “Bybee Memo.” This August 2002 memorandum from
Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee to then-White House
Counsel Alberto Gonzales expressly defines torture by the
quantum of pain the victim experiences. The Memo states that
to constitute torture under U.S. law,74 “severe pain” must be
inflicted on a prisoner; further, “severe pain” means pain “akin
to that which accompanies serious physical injury such as
death or organ failure.”75
Although the Bybee Memo and its progeny equate torture
and pain, they do so nonsensically: What is the degree of pain
equivalent to organ failure or death? Death can be painless;
organ failure, too, may be pain-free, as when heart failure
causes a person to slip away during sleep. Conversely, excruci-
atingly painful torments may not result in organ failure. The
Bybee Memo adopted this incoherent definition from other
U.S. statutes that do not themselves define pain.76 It has been
criticized extensively for nearly every other aspect of its logic
and legitimacy.77 Indeed, not long after it became public, the
Department of Justice replaced it with new guidance known as
the “Levin Memo” that expressly condemned torture.78
Yet the heart of the Bybee Memo has not been repudiated or
abandoned. The notion remains that torture is best defined by
the victim’s quantum of acute pain. The Levin Memo uses as
examples of torture only those
practices that inflict the most
extreme pain and which would
have qualified under the defini-
tion of torture found in the Bybee
Memo.79
2. Torture as Power
Relations
While many efforts to define torture described above turn
on degree of pain, there is nothing close to a consensus on
which acts (or omissions) constitute torture. Taking a different
approach, other scholars seek to define torture in terms of
power rather than pain. John T. Parry, for example, has
advanced the notion that torture is the infliction of even brief,
non-severe pain if it occurs “against a background of total con-
trol and potential escalation that asserts the state’s dominance
and unsettles or destroys the victim’s normative world.”80 Sim-
ilarly, David Sussman has described the true horror of torture
as that which results from the “asymmetry of power, knowl-
edge, and prerogative” between interrogator and subject,
where “the victim is in a position of complete vulnerability and
exposure, the torturer in one of perfect control and inscrutabil-
ity.”81 These definitions capture something about the horror of
torture that the purely pain-based definitions do not: that the
normative dimensions of torture—the ability to psychologi-
cally destroy the victim and cause the renunciation of whatever
had been held most sacred—comprise an essential component
of torture.
At least one important supranational organization has
adopted an approach to defining torture that is consistent
with the intuitions about torture expressed in these non-pain-
based definitions. The Inter-American Convention to Prevent
and Punish Torture (Inter-American Convention) looks to the
relational aspects of a torture situation rather than to degrees
of pain.82 The Inter-American Convention defines torture
such that any degree of pain may constitute torture provided
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http://www.bartleby.com/130/index.html (advocating the limita-
tion of society’s authority over individuals).
89. Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel,
Central Intelligence Agency re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-
2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interroga-
tion of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee (May 10, 2005), reprinted
in THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE 152,
191–96 (David Cole ed., 2009).
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it is inflicted for specified pur-
poses: for “criminal investiga-
tion, as a means of intimida-
tion, as personal punishment,
as a preventive measure, as a
penalty, or for any other pur-
pose” other than those incident
to lawful sanctions.  This Con-
vention illustrates the values
component of torture—that
physical pain may have less sig-
nificance than the purpose for
which dominance is being
exerted and the impact on the
mental state of the victim. 
While these non-pain-based definitions capture a certain
aspect of the issue, they do not grapple with what I would
argue remains the essence of torture as an embodied experi-
ence. It cannot be the case that a mere disparity in power is
sufficient to constitute torture. Asymmetries of power, knowl-
edge, and prerogative are not only common but ubiquitous. In
a world of inequalities, power dynamics between subjects are
the norm, not the exception.  
3. Harms of Torture Beyond Direct Harm to 
Victims
The liberal theoretical objection to torture offers another
approach that is neither narrowly rooted in the victim’s pain
nor focused on the victim’s emotional experience, focusing
instead on the harms of torture to the body politic. The abhor-
rence of cruelty, as Judith N. Shklar has argued, only arises
with liberal consciousness because physical subjugation of the
individual to the raison d’état was presumed in earlier peri-
ods.83 Norms of respect for the prisoner’s body began to
emerge in European society only after the French Revolu-
tion.84 The writings of statesmen and political philosophers
active in the founding of the United States and in the political
underpinnings of the American and French revolutions also
had parts to play, making evident that the primary party
harmed by torture is the state practicing it. To take one of
many examples, Patrick Henry spoke passionately against tor-
ture: “What has distinguished our ancestors? That they would
not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But
Congress may . . . tell you that there is such a necessity of
strengthening the arm of government, that they must . . .
extort confession by torture . . . . We are then lost and
undone.”85 As David Luban argues, “torture is a microcosm,
raised to the highest level of intensity, of . . . tyrannical polit-
ical relationships,”86 of the elevation of the state (Staatsraison
or raison d’état) over the autonomy and dignity of the indi-
vidual.87 This puts torture in direct opposition to liberal polit-
ical theory.  Rather, the individual’s triumph over the state
may be seen as liberalism’s core achievement.88
4. Torture, Measurement, and Embodied Morality
Definitions of torture that focus exclusively on degree of
bodily pain ultimately mislead because they suggest a mea-
surement fallacy—the fallacy that torture is no more than a lot
of pain.  Waterboarding provides the paradigmatic example of
the shortcomings of and subterfuges permitted by the notion
of torture as specific and measurable pain. Volunteers who
have experienced waterboarding describe the experience as not
intensely, physically painful but nevertheless filled with panic
and dread.89 Because of the emphasis on physical pain in
recent interpretative guidelines governing torture,90 propo-
nents of waterboarding and similar practices may argue that it
categorically does not constitute torture because it simply does
not hurt enough.
Conversely, definitions of torture that abjure a connection
to the body’s suffering are overinclusive and fail to account for
the status of the body in relation to moral theory and political
theory. Thus, both torture and torture-murder show how legal
categories defined by pain cannot be reduced to facts about the
body yet remain rooted in it through embodied morality. 
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Challenges to Lethal Injections, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1301, 1301,
1304–06 (2007) (noting that “[a]n explosion of Eighth Amend-
ment challenges to lethal injection protocols has struck the fed-
eral courts” and describing such litigation).
92. Id. at 1304 (citing Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1043
(N.D. Cal.), aff’d per curiam, 438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006)) (col-
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93. 547 U.S. 573 (2006); see also Douglas A. Berman, Finding Bickel
Gold in a Hill of Beans, 2005–2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 311, 318
(“[T]he Court’s work in Hill had a profound nationwide ripple
effect on lethal injection litigation and on state efforts to carry out
scheduled executions.”). Section 1983 permits a petitioner to
challenge the circumstances of a lawfully imposed sentence; thus
it is more limited than a habeas claim, which challenges the law-
fulness of the sentence itself. See Hill, 547 U.S. at 579.
94. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SO LONG AS THEY DIE: LETHAL INJECTIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (2006), available at http://
hrw.org/reports/2006/us0406/us0406web.pdf.
95. Brown v. Beck, No. 5:06CT3018 H, 2006 WL 3914717, at *7
(E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2006).
96. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 94, at 22.
97. See Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 300, 309, 312–13
(Tenn. 2005) (declining to apply a state animal euthanasia statute
to humans but noting the potential painfulness of the challenged
substance).
98. 553 U.S. 35, 41, 49-50 (2008).
99. See id. at 41.
100. See id. at 59.
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III. CASE STUDY: ACUTE PAIN IN DEATH PENALTY AND
ABORTION LAWMAKING
Two highly contentious, current legal controversies appear
to be framed exclusively in terms of quanta of pain: Eighth
Amendment challenges to the death penalty and limitations on
abortion based upon fetal pain. In Eighth Amendment chal-
lenges to the death penalty, the battlefront has moved from the
constitutionality of execution to the question of whether lethal
injection is unconstitutionally painful. In abortion legislation
and jurisprudence, the pressing contemporary question has
transformed from the constitutionality of access to the proce-
dure to whether the procedure may be limited on the ground
that fetuses experience pain. In these areas, the major public
claims have shifted from arguments for outright abolition to
arguments for pain-limiting restrictions. That is, opponents of
these practices argue for their severe curtailment based on the
unwarranted degree of pain they cause while supporters either
assert that current practices are sufficiently humane or not
painful.
These two controversies, at first glance, appear to represent
classic instances where empirical information about degree of
pain would be dispositive. Yet the terms of the debates them-
selves show that the appeal to pain is substantially strategic.
Guaranteeing complete painlessness in administering abor-
tions and the death penalty would not resolve the abovemen-
tioned problems; the abolition debate would simply shift to yet
another area. This is not to say that real pain does not count,
or that limiting suffering is not in itself a worthy goal; rather,
these discourses do not view the limiting of suffering as the
primary issue. 
A. PAIN-BASED CHALLENGES TO THE DEATH
PENALTY
Since 2006, all major anti-death-penalty litigation has
focused on Eighth Amendment challenges to the painfulness
of lethal injection.91 Prior to 2006, the Supreme Court had
rejected method-of-execution challenges to lethal injection.92
Then, in Hill v. McDonough, the Court held that petitioners
could employ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the method of
their scheduled lethal injections as a violation of their civil
rights.93
The usual claim raised under § 1983 is the following: The
most common lethal injection protocol, which involves three
drugs being injected in
sequence, sometimes fails. If the
drug that induces unconscious-
ness is not administered success-
fully, the condemned remains
conscious during injection of
the final drugs.94 Without ade-
quate anesthesia, one such drug,
potassium chloride, causes
“excruciating pain”95 as it
“inflames . . . the sensory nerve
fibers, literally burning up the
veins as it travels to the heart.”96
The third drug, pancuronium
bromide, is believed to be no less
painful.97
Post-Hill Eighth Amendment
challenges to the painfulness of
lethal injection have necessarily
styled themselves as method-of-
execution cases. Yet, they effec-
tively use the claim of pain to
challenge the practice of execu-
tion itself. This is clearest in Baze v. Rees, in which the Supreme
Court both clarified and confounded the state of pain-based
challenges to lethal injection.98 In Baze, two Kentucky death-
row inmates challenged the state’s lethal injection protocol as
unconstitutional because it had the potential to cause a cruel
or unusual level of pain.99
This surely looked like a purely pain-based challenge in
which success on the merits would have done nothing for the
petitioners but tweak the execution protocol to which they
were entitled. But the petitioners (or their attorneys) had a
clever play: they asserted that only physician monitoring
would assure an execution sufficiently pain-free to satisfy con-
stitutional standards.100 However, physicians in Kentucky may
not legally assist in any capacity with executions. Since doctors
cannot participate in executions, a decision requiring physi-
cian monitoring of pain would have the underlying effect of
halting executions.101
The Court did not bite. The Court very narrowly held that
Kentucky’s execution protocol did not require medical moni-
toring while reserving judgment as to the constitutionality of
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ion) (noting that a criminal sanction may not impose “gratuitous
infliction of suffering” unrelated to “penological justification”);
see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (“Punishments
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death . . . . It
implies there [sic] something inhuman and barbarous, some-
thing more than the mere extinguishment of life.”).
104. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding
that the death penalty is unconstitutional for juvenile offenders);
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between Bentham’s animal-welfare argument and positions
adopted by those who understand abortion at least partially in
terms of a fetus as a rights-bearing entity with a right to be free
of pain).
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“alleviate organic pain to the fetus”); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
145.4242(a)(1)(iv) (West 2011) (requiring that the female be
told “whether or not an anesthetic or analgesic would eliminate
or alleviate organic pain to the unborn child”); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, §§ 1-738.6 to -.17 (West 2011) (requiring physician to
inform female of state-provided materials containing “informa-
tion on pain and the unborn child”).
111. H.R. 6099, 109th Cong. (2006); see also H.R. 6099: Unborn
Child Pain Awareness Act of 2006, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-6099.
the risk and amount of pain inci-
dent to the execution protocol of
any other state.102
Baze shows how pain stands
in as a proxy for the larger values
and commitments at stake. In
bringing a challenge to the
degree of painfulness of Ken-
tucky’s execution protocol, the
litigants meant to do no less than
halt the practice of execution in
Kentucky. In deciding Baze so
narrowly, the Court effectively
left the door open not only for
future method-of-execution cases
but for challenges to the practice
of execution itself (regardless of
whether intent can be imputed to
a fractured court).
At the same time, there is no
doubt that the facts of bodily pain also played a non-incidental
role in Baze. At one extreme, if Kentucky’s execution method
were demonstrably painless, the litigants could not have styled
the case as a pain-based Eighth Amendment challenge. At the
other extreme, if the Kentucky execution protocol involved
gratuitous pain, no justice could have affirmed it because set-
tled precedent would deem it unconstitutional.103
Pain thus played a real role in this question, if only at the
extremes. But everything in between these extremes involves
clearly normative judgments as to the level of pain a state or a
society finds tolerable in the specific context of the death
penalty. And it is in this unquantifiable, normative ground that
ideological differences between members of the Court emerge.
On the one hand, if the punishment of execution equates to the
taking of life, execution should be actually painless—anything
else is gratuitous, additional punishment. Justices espousing
this view, unsurprisingly, have espoused anti-death-penalty
views and have proven instrumental in limiting the application
of the death penalty to special populations like juveniles and
the intellectually disabled.104 On the other hand, justices who
view pain incident to death as an acceptable part of execution
do not find themselves ideologically opposed to the death
penalty.105 The “pain tolerance,” as it were, of justices on both
sides of the issue is a reflection of and a proxy for their values.
B. FETAL PAIN AS ABORTION CHALLENGE
As death-penalty litigation has evolved toward challenges to
the practice’s painfulness, so too has the controversy around
another great lightning rod in American politics—abortion.
The strategy of focusing on fetal pain allows the debate to shift
away from the endless and irresoluble controversy over per-
sonhood. Instead, it permits anti-abortion advocates to pro-
pose, along with Bentham, that “[t]he question is not Can they
reason?, nor, Can they talk?, but Can they suffer?”106 In addi-
tion to Bentham’s moral question, the disgust factor related to
thinking about fetal pain also plays a role, a factor that may be
more viscerally effective than the philosophical and rhetorical
strategies related to personhood.
The tactic of focusing on pain has had considerable success.
In 2010, Nebraska passed the Abortion Pain Prevention Act,
which bans abortions of any fetus deemed “pain capable.”107
The statute establishes a bright-line rule (subject to the typical
exceptions)108 that no abortion may be performed at or after
the 20th week of gestation on the ground that such fetuses can
experience pain.109 Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, and
Oklahoma passed inform-and-consent, fetal pain abortion leg-
islation.110 A proposed federal inform-and-consent statute, the
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act, also known as the “Abor-
tion Pain Bill,” nearly passed the House of Representatives in
2006.111
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or earlier may also feel pain. See ROYAL COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS &
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WPR0610.pdf [hereinafter RCOG Report]. Hormonal, environ-
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The Abortion Pain Bill had a similar rationale to those of the
state inform-and-consent statutes currently in force, made evi-
dent from its requirement that abortion providers make acces-
sible to pregnant women a brochure stating the following:
There is substantial evidence that the process of being
killed in an abortion will cause the unborn child pain,
even though you receive a pain-reducing drug or drugs.
Under [this Act], you have a right to know that there is
evidence that the process of being killed in an abortion
will cause your unborn child pain.112
As the language above indicates, repugnance to abortion—
not fetal pain itself—is the driving force behind these statutes.
These statutes can be understood as symbolic in several ways.
First, they do not curtail any significant abortion practice,
applying to 1% or less of abortions.113 Second, they do not con-
form to the best objective, current science on fetal pain. 
The American Medical Association suggests that fetuses
cannot experience pain until at least 29 weeks,114 while the
British Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists
concludes that fetuses cannot feel pain up until birth because
“the fetus never experiences a state of true wakefulness in
utero and is kept . . .  in a continuous, sleep-like uncon-
sciousness or sedation.”115 Other researchers conclude that
fetuses prior to 24 weeks may, like a person in a coma, expe-
rience nociception without experiencing pain.116 The 24-week
threshold holds significance for another reason: by 24 weeks,
the fetus is viable.
In this arena, judgments about the presence and degree of
pain align well with moral precommitments. The moral sub-
strate of this discourse makes it highly improbable that any
degree of scientific knowledge about fetal pain would materi-
ally change basic positions on abortion. For those to whom
abortion equals the unjustified taking of human life, knowl-
edge of the presence or absence of fetal pain would not alter
their view of its wrongfulness. For those to whom abortion
does not constitute the taking of a human life, knowledge of
the presence or absence of fetal pain might at the margin
change views about abortion timing or protocols but would
not alter their central belief that the rights of the individual
trump those of the merely incipi-
ent individual. Again, the role of
pain in the abortion debate seems
best explained by ideologies and
moral commitments.
CONCLUSION
The development of neu-
rotechnologies prompts us to
reexamine the role that the body,
including the brain and brain
state, plays within the law. With-
out opportunities to measure
and ascertain brain states like
pain, legal discourse about pain
can function as both a heuristic
and as a set of facts about the
body, shifting back and forth
between both. When neurotech-
nology promises the ability to
measure pain, it requires us to ask the question of what, pre-
cisely, measurement will solve. This forces us to untangle the
heuristic nature of pain discourse from its physical, factual
bases. Thus, pain neuroimaging not only provides a possible
tool for measuring pain but also for separating which types of
legal discourse about pain are principally heuristic or princi-
pally factual.
This set of technologies will or should lead to a more
explicit realization of how culture, as mediated through legal
culture, engages in and produces embodied normativity. How
we experience the body is shaped by norms; reciprocally, our
norms about the body are shaped by physical experience itself.
In turn, physical experience provides grounding for defining
what constitutes moral or immoral treatment of the bodies of
others and what conduct toward the bodies of others valorizes
or corrupts our values.
A sense of the normative relationship to the body leads to
moral judgments about what is or is not morally permissible
conduct. Pain occupies a unique position in this regard onto-
logically and epistemologically. There is an ontological pri-
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macy to pain because it is through the suffering of the self that
we understand the wrongfulness of causing gratuitous suffer-
ing to others; some of this is direct, empathic, and likely phys-
iological. In a sense, such reasoning is grounded in the body’s
physicality. And yet, it is also grounded in the body’s status
within the nomos, which is informed by—but not coextensive
with—physiological experience. The experience of the body,
both of self and “other,” is also contingent. Sociohistorical con-
text defines which “others” are seen as sufficiently like the self
such that their pain experience is credited as real; once cate-
gorized, they are deemed deserving of protection from pain.
Since such questions as “who can suffer?” and “whose suffer-
ing counts?” define the membership of the community of
empathic inclusion, they also define what degree of treatment
toward particular legal subjects (whether humans, human
fetuses, animals, conscious machines, and others yet to be
named) is permissible.
Though primarily normative determinations about status,
these questions also involve factual determinations of bodily
capacities and of the subject’s relationship (if any) to its
embodiment. In these ways, the question of pain neuroimaging
shows that there must always be significant translational work
in moving from neuroimaging technologies to their legal uses
and implications. Questions in law about or involving the body
(perhaps particularly questions about the brain) are rarely pure
questions of fact or value. Rather, we must understand the
heuristic and normative role of the law’s body-language—of
the embodied morality implicit within the law—to properly
understand if, when, and how to adapt the findings of brain
imaging to bodies of legal doctrine. Knowledge of what causes
the body to suffer informs what a society views as moral or
immoral treatment of the person; nevertheless, simple mea-
surement can never resolve fundamental questions about just
treatment.
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